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What Parents Don't Know: Informed Consent, Marriage,
and Genital-Normalizing Surgery on Intersex Children
SAMANTHA S. USLAN*
INTRODUCTION
When most children are born, the first words out of the doctor's mouth are "It's a
boy!" or "It's a girl!" When Mani Bruce Mitchell was born, however, she was
welcomed into the world by the words, "It's a hermaphrodite!"' Initially determined to
be a member of the male sex, Mitchell was given the name Bruce and raised as a boy
until just before her first birthday when "invasive surgery determined her sex as female
and she became Margaret." 2 When Mitchell was eight years old, she underwent
additional surgery to remove "what she describes as a small penis or very large clitoris,
and [to] bring[] [her] uterus and vagina forward.",3 The surgery left Mitchell with
outwardly female genitalia and impaired sexual functioning.4
After years of living in secrecy and shame, Mitchell is finally comfortable with
herself and her past.5 She is now open about her status as an intersexual and advocates
against surgeries like those performed on her when she was a child.6 She hopes that one
day the decision to undergo genital-normalizing surgery will "be left for the person
who owns the body" and that "society [will] get to a place where it's comfortable with
bodies that look different.",
7
Unfortunately, Mitchell's story is not unique.8 It has been estimated that somewhere
between 1 in 1500 and I in 2000 children are born each year with sufficiently
ambiguous genitalia such that the sex of the child cannot be immediately determined. 9
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Indiana University Maurer School of Law - Bloomington. I
would like to thank Professor Dawn Johnsen for her comments and insight in developing this
Note.
1. Standing Proud to Break the Cycle of Shame and Secrecy, N.Z. HERALD, Apr. 5, 2008,
at A18, available at 2008 WLNR 6356352. The term "hermaphrodite" is used to refer to
individuals with ambiguous external genitalia. Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male andFemale:
Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 285 (1999).
While some members of the medical profession continue to use the term "hermaphrodite," the
term is felt by many to be both mythologizing and stigmatizing and has been largely replaced by
the term "intersexual," which is now the preferred term. See CATHERINE HARPER, INTERSEX 2-3
(2007).
2. Standing Proud to Break the Cycle of Shame and Secrecy, supra note 1, at A 18.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id. In addition to the trauma and secrecy surrounding her childhood surgeries,
Mitchell was also the victim of childhood sexual abuse. Id. Unfortunately, sexual abuse is not
uncommon among intersex and transgender children. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See, for example, INTERSEX IN THE AGE OF ETHics (Alice Dormurat Dreger ed., 1999),
and SHARON E. PREVES, INTERSEX AND IDENTITY: THE CONTESTED SELF (2003), for additional
stories on the personal experiences of intersex individuals.
9. Intersex Soc'y of N. Am., How Common is Intersex?, http://www.isna.org/faq/
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In 2005, the San Francisco Human Rights Commission estimated that genital-
normalizing surgeries are performed on approximately five babies every day in the
United States.' 0
The practice of surgically altering the ambiguous genitalia of intersex I I infants has
grown out of the theories posed by psychologist John Money.12 Money believed that all
children are psychosexually neutral at birth and can be molded into either gender, so
long as the child's anatomy is altered to reflect the chosen gender at an early age and
the people around the child treat the child as a member of the chosen gender.' 3 Money
was given the opportunity to test his theories when he was presented with David
Reimer, an eight-month-old male whose penis was accidentally destroyed during
surgery.14 Reimer also had an identical twin brother. 15 Upon Money's recommendation,
Reimer's parents consented to sex-reassignment surgery, and Reimer's "testicles were
removed, female-appearing genitalia were constructed, and he was raised as a girl.' 16
Money continued to meet with both Reimer and his twin for several years, and though
Reimer displayed a number of boyish tendencies, Money deemed the procedure a
success. 17 In 1972, Money published his findings on Reimer's successful
transformation from a male child to a female child in what became known as the
John/Joan case. '
8
The story of David Reimer, however, does not end there. Contrary to Money's
findings, it was ultimately revealed that Reimer never truly accepted his status as a
female, despite the surgical and hormonal alterations.' 9 When he was fourteen years
frequency. It is difficult to state the frequency of intersex births due to the vagueness inherent in
the definition of intersexuality. See Alice Dormurat Dreger, "Ambiguous Sex "--OrAmbivalent
Medicine? Ethical Issues in the Treatment of Intersexuality, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June
1998, at 24, 26 (discussing the difficulty in determining the rate of intersexuality because of the
"struggle[] with the question of what should count as 'ambiguous"'). The frequency may also be
higher due to the secrecy often surrounding intersexuality, Intersex Initiative: Intersex
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.intersexinitiative.org/articles/intersex-faq.html, and the
fact that not all intersex conditions are readily identifiable at birth, Intersex Soc'y of N. Am.,
supra.
10. MARCUS DE MARIA ARANA, S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, A HUMAN RIGHTS
INVESTIGATION INTO THE MEDICAL "NORMALIzATION" OF INTERSEX PEOPLE 23 (2005).
11. While there is no universal definition of intersexuality, the term generally refers to a
broad range of conditions in which an individual possesses both male and female anatomical
characteristics. See, e.g., Dreger, supra note 9, at 26.
12. See ALICE DORMURAT DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES AND THE MEDICAL INVENTION OF SEX
181-82 (1998).
13. Dreger, supra note 9, at 25.
14. See Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, David Reimer's Legacy: Limiting Parental
Discretion, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 5, 11 (2005).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and MedicalDilemma:
Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 7-8 (2000).
18. See id. at 5-7 & n. 12. "Money and others repeatedly asserted that 'Johns' could be
made into 'Joans' and 'Joans' into 'Johns' so long as the genitals looked 'right' and everyone
agreed to agree on the child's assigned gender." Dreger, supra note 9, at 25.
19. See Kenneth Kipnis & Milton Diamond, Pediatric Ethics and the Surgical Assignment
of Sex, in INTERSEX IN THE AGE OF ETHICS, supra note 8, at 173, 179-80. John Money
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old, Reimer threatened to kill himself if he could not live as a male, prompting his
parents to finally tell him the truth about his past.20 Reimer rejected his female sex
assignment, underwent multiple surgeries in an effort to restore his male genitalia, and
began living as a man.2' Reimer ultimately took his own life in 2004.22
The revelation of the true outcome of the John/Joan case as well as its tragic ending
have led many to question whether the surgical alteration of intersex children continues
to be an appropriate treatment 23 and, more fundamentally, whether the parents of
intersex children, like those of Mani Bruce Mitchell and David Reimer, have the
authority to consent to such procedures for their children.24 Neither Mitchell nor
Reimer were granted the dignity of making her/his own decision on whether or not to
surgically alter her/his body. Parents of intersex children likely consent to genital-
normalizing surgeries based on what they believe is in their child's best interest.
However, parents are ill-equipped to make a decision that fully encompasses all of the
child's future interests because those future interests are in conflict with the parents'
interest in having a "normal" child.25 A decision of such fundamental importance
should ultimately be left to the child.
In recent years, scholars and intersex activists have called for a moratorium on
genital-normalizing surgeries, arguing that the parents of intersex children do not have
the authority to consent to such procedures.26 In particular, scholars have argued that
consent to genital-normalizing surgery is beyond the scope of parental decision-making
authority because genital-normalizing surgeries implicate the child's fundamental
rights, including the right to procreate, the right to bodily integrity, the right to sexual
gratification, and the right to marriage.27
This Note explores and expands on the potential implications of genital-normalizing
surgeries on the fundamental right to marriage, and it ultimately calls for legislative
action barring parents from consenting to genital-normalizing surgeries, except in cases
of true medical emergencies, until the child is able to make his or her own decision.
The dehumanizing effects of genital-normalizing surgeries become particularly
apparent when viewed through the lens of marriage; analysis of the impact of genital-
"acknowledged the failure of treatment but theorized that other variables including surgical
delay may have caused the child to reject the assigned gender." Beh & Diamond, supra note 17,
at 9 n.30.
20. Beh & Diamond, supra note 14, at 12.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 7 n.7.
23. See id. at 7.
24. See, e.g., id. at 8.
25. See id. at 7-8.
26. Id. at 9.
27. Sara R. Benson, Hacking the Gender Binary Myth: Recognizing Fundamental Rights
for the Intersexed, 12 CARDozo J.L. & GENDER 31 (2005) (discussing genital-normalizing
surgery and the rights to bodily integrity, personality, sexuality, and gender identity); Kate Haas,
Who Will Make Room for the Intersexed?, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 41 (2004) (discussing genital-
normalizing surgery and the rights to bodily integrity, procreation, and marriage); Erin Lloyd,
Note, From the Hospital to the Courtroom: A Statutory Proposal for Recognizing and
Protecting the Legal Rights of Intersex Children, 12 CARDOzO J.L. & GENDER 155 (2005)
(discussing genital-normalizing surgery and the rights to bodily integrity, sexual gratification,
procreation, and marriage).
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normalizing surgeries on marriage makes clear that the problem is multifaceted and
28largely created by society.
The driving force behind the performance of genital-normalizing surgeries is
society's insistence that each person fit neatly within the binary gender system, which
includes only the categories of male and female. 29 It is this insistence that pressures
parents to consent to genital-normalizing surgeries in the first place. Within the binary
gender system, society has created the institution of marriage, which it has largely
chosen to limit to "opposite" sex couples.30 Individuals who do not fit neatly within the
binary system, such as intersexuals and same-sex couples, expose the fallacies inherent
in the binary gender system and in the traditional marital institution that excludes same-
sex couples.3' The fact that genital-normalizing surgeries have the potential to impact
the right to marriage is a problem that society has essentially created. It is a result of
both the societal insistence on a binary gender system that fails to recognize
intersexuals and the way that society has chosen to define and limit marriage. It is
within this context that the impact of genital-normalizing surgeries on the right to
marriage is examined.
Part I of this Note explains the current treatment protocol for children born with
ambiguous genitalia as well as some ofthe common criticisms of that approach. Part II
discusses the parental right to consent to medical treatment for their children and the
limitations on parental decision-making authority when the proposed treatment
implicates fundamental rights. Part III begins with a discussion of marriage as a
fundamental right as well as the ways that society has chosen to define and limit
marriage. Then, it discusses the various ways that courts have defined sex for the
purpose of marriage and explores the potential implications that genital-normalizing
surgeries could have on this right. Part IV argues that because genital-normalizing
surgeries can affect the fundamental right to marriage, parental consent to such
procedures should not be allowed. It further argues that judicial oversight will not
adequately protect the rights of intersex children and ultimately calls for a legislative
ban on genital-normalizing surgeries.
I. THE CURRENT TREATMENT PROTOCOL FOR INTERSEX CHILDREN
John Money's work in the 1960s provided the foundation for the initial treatment of
intersex conditions: surgical intervention.3 2 Under this traditional approach to intersex
births, children born with ambiguous genitalia are assigned a sex based on their
chromosomal make up and on the presence and size of a phallus.33 The child then
28. See infra Part III.
29. See Julie Greenberg, Legal Aspects of Gender Assignment, 13 ENDOCRiNOLOGIST 277,
277 (2003); Jessica Knouse, Intersexuality and the Social Construction ofAnatomical Sex, 12
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 135, 135 (2005). "The male/female binary is absolutely pervasive in
Western thought, and our culture has no third category to recognize intersex individuals as
anything other than deformed males or females." Id. at 146.
30. See Greenberg, supra note 1, at 296-99.
31. See id.; see also Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals, Intersexuals, and Same-Sex Marriage,
18 BYUJ. PuB. L. 371 (2004).
32. See Dreger, supra note 9, at 27.
33. Id.
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undergoes surgery in order to make the genitalia appear "normal" in an effort to
maximize the child's psychosocial development.34 The surgical approach has come
under intense scrutiny in recent years and has led to the development of an alternative
treatment paradigm that encourages physicians to consider a broad spectrum of factors
before assigning an intersex child a sex and performing any subsequent surgeries.
35
Because the surgical approach has served as the dominant approach to intersex births
for many decades, it is unlikely that this new treatment protocol will result in an end to
genital-normalizing surgeries.36 These two competing treatment paradigms as well as
the criticisms of the surgical approach are discussed below.
A. The Surgical Approach
Dr. John Money's research and theories ushered in what Dr. Alice Dreger, a
prominent scholar and activist in the field, describes as "The Age of Surgery" in which
"each body [is] allowed only a single true sex, and the medical doctor [is] the
determiner or even the creator of it."'37 Intersex children are assigned a sex based on the
doctor's ability to preserve either male sexual functioning or female reproductive
capabilities. 38 Once a sex is assigned, surgical techniques are used in order to
"normalize" the genitalia so that the child can be "raised as [a] girl[] or boy[] with no
hint of abnormality." 39 Surgical intervention is seen as a "cure" to the anatomical
abnormalities present in an intersex birth that make it difficult for doctors to fit
intersexuals into either the male or female category.
40
Under this approach, intersex births are treated as a "medical and social emergency
requiring early surgical intervention. ' 41 Proponents of genital-normalizing surgery
argue that without surgical intervention, children born with ambiguous genitalia will
become victim to teasing from other children and will ultimately be unable to form a
gender identity.42 With these risks in mind, proponents urge that surgery be performed
as soon as possible and that both the parents and the child be told "less than the whole
truth about the nature of the condition" in order to maximize the child's psychological
well being and ultimate conformity with the assigned gender.43
In order for a child to be deemed a member of the male sex, the size of the phallus
must be "adequate," or be capable of being made so through surgery or hormone
34. Id.
35. See Peter A. Lee, Christopher P. Houk, S. Faisal Ahmed & leuan A. Hughes, Consensus
Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders, 118 PEDIATRICS e488, e491 (2006).
36. Emily A. Bishop, Note, A Child's Expertise: Establishing Statutory Protection for
Intersexed Children Who Reject Their Gender of Assignment, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 531, 547
(2007).
37. Alice Dormurat Dreger, A History of Intersex: From the Age of Gonads to the Age of
Consent, in INTERSEX IN THE AGE OF ETHIcs, supra note 8, at 5, 11.
38. Greenberg, supra note 29, at 277. This approach has been criticized as being based on
sex-role stereotypes, id. at 277, and a "heterosexist framework," DREGER, supra note 12, at 184.
39. Kipnis & Diamond, supra note 19, at 177.
40. See id. at 177 (analogizing genital-normalizing surgeries to correcting a cleft palate).
41. Greenberg, supra note 29, at 279.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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treatments. 44 If a child has a Y chromosome and is thus a genetic male, then that child
will be raised as a male if the length of the stretched phallus is greater than 2.5
centimeters, or one inch.45 Surgical procedures and hormone treatments are performed
in order to make the phallus look more "believable. ' 46 If, however, the size of the
phallus is less than 2.5 centimeters, then the child will be assigned to the female sex,
regardless of the presence of a Y chromosome or a phallus.4 7 Once again, this is
accomplished through the use of surgery and hormone treatments. 48 "[S]urgeons
refashion phalluses to look like clitorises. .. , build vulvas and vaginas if necessary,
and remove any testes. This is done even if it means risking a child's only real chance
at becoming a biological parent, because intersex doctors consider 'adequate' penises
far more important for boys than potential fertility."
49
Intersex children who lack the presence of a Y chromosome are assigned to the
female sex.50 "This is done chiefly in the interest of preserving these children's
potential feminine reproductive capabilities and in bringing their anatomical
appearance and physiological capabilities into line with that reproductive role.",5' As a
result, these children are treated in much the same way as intersexuals born with a Y
chromosome and an "inadequate" phallus.5 2 "Vaginas are built or lengthened if
necessary, in order to make them big enough to accept average-sized penises. Joined
labia are separated, and various other surgical and hormonal treatments are directed at
producing a believable and, it is hoped, fertile girl. 53
The ultimate goal of the surgeons is to maintain the reproductive capability of
females and to maintain the male sexual prowess by ensuring that a male child will
have an "adequate" male phallus.54 This entire practice reaffirms the stereotypical
gender roles of women as mothers and men as sexual beings and ultimately reaffirms
the gender binary system.
55
B. Criticisms of the Surgical Approach
The widespread publication of David Reimer's true story and his sad demise has led
many to question whether the surgical approach continues to be appropriate. 6 In recent
44. Dreger, supra note 37, at 12 ("If it looks like a believable penis to the doctors, or if they
think they can make it look like what they think a penis should look like, the child will be
assigned the boy gender.").
45. Id.
46. Id. ("Doctors will examine this child at regular intervals and work-using surgical and
endocrinological technologies-to make him look like a 'true' boy.").
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. DREGER, supra note 12, at 182.
50. Dreger, supra note 37, at 12.
51. Dreger, supra note 9, at 28.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Greenberg, supra note 29, at 277.
55. See DREGER, SUpra note 12, at 184.
56. See Dreger, supra note 9, at 7. John Money "acknowledged the failure of treatment but
theorized that other variables including surgical delay may have caused the child to reject the
assigned gender." Beh & Diamond, supra note 17, at 9 n.30.
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years, intersex activists have become increasingly vocal, denouncing the surgical
approach for a number of reasons.57 As Dr. Dreger described: "Patients are lied to;
risky procedures are performed without follow-up; consent is not fully informed;
autonomy and health are risked because of unproven (and even disproven) fears that
atypical anatomy will lead to psychological disaster."
58
One of the main arguments against the dominant treatment protocol for intersex
births is that it is dehumanizing and results in both shame and physical and emotional
trauma for the parents and patients. 59 In most cases, the decision to undergo genital-
normalizing surgery is not made by the patient, but by doctors and family members
who are uncomfortable with the intersex child's genitalia. 6° Genital-normalizing
surgery may result in scarring, a loss of sexual functioning or the ability to experience
sexual pleasure, and a loss of reproductive capabilities. 61 These procedures are
performed with very little long-term data showing that the surgeries are actually
effective.62 Additionally, reports abound showing that the child often rejects the sex
chosen by the parents. 63 Sadly, these procedures are "essentially irreversible." 64
Intersex births are treated as medical emergencies, though few actually require
immediate medical attention.65 In fact, parents are rarely told that most surgeries can be
postponed until the child is capable of making his or her own decision and that
surgeries performed later in life are often more successful and more positively received
by the patients.66 In addition, parents are rarely told that multiple surgeries will be
needed.67 "Thirty to eighty percent of all children undergoing genital surgery have
multiple procedures, ranging from three to five such operations. In many instances it
involves complicated upkeep, multiple surgeries, and painful side effects. 68
The devastating effects of such surgeries are most apparent in the case of children
who have undergone vaginoplasty procedures, a surgical procedure that creates a
vagina.69 These procedures require a great deal of upkeep, most of which is traumatic
to the child.70 In order to prevent the newly created cavity from closing, the child's
vagina must be dilated on a daily basis. 71 This task often falls to the child's parents.
72
57. See Greenberg, supra note 29, at 279.
58. Dreger, supra note 9, at 33.
59. DE MARIA ARANA, supra note 10, at 17-18,24. It has also been reported that the parents
of intersex children "report feeling shame, fear, horror, humiliation, regrets, and ongoing doubt
about the choices they may have made for their children." Id. at 22.
60. Id. at 18.
61. Id. at 19, 21.
62. Kipnis & Diamond, supra note 19, at 187.
63. Bruce E. Wilson & William G. Reiner, Management oflntersex: A Shifting Paradigm,
in INTERSEX IN THE AGE OF ETHICs, supra note 8, at 119, 126.
64. DE MARiA ARANA, supra note 10, at 21.
65. Beh & Diamond, supra note 17, at 44.
66. See DE MARIA ARANA, supra note 10, at 19, 22. This is because these surgeries are
easier to perform on larger anatomy, and "[e]arly childhood surgeries often necessitate revisions
to accommodate body growth." Id.
67. Id. at 22.
68. Benson, supra note 27, at 47.
69. See id. at 45-46.
70. See id.
71. Id.
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Unsurprisingly, "many intersexuals later describe medical exams and procedures that
they were subjected to as children as sexual abuse."73 Because of the egregious nature
of this procedure and other sex-assignment procedures, many activists have called for a
moratorium on such surgeries, except in true medical emergencies, until the child is
capable of making his or her own decision.
74
C. Emergence of a New Treatment Protocol
In 2006, the American Academy of Pediatrics adopted a new policy with respect to
the treatment of intersex births in which "[t]he birth of an intersex child prompts a
long-term management strategy that involves myriad professionals working with the
family."7 5 Unlike the traditional approach, the new policy suggests that physicians
consider a variety of factors before determining which sex to assign the child, including
the child's medical "diagnosis, genital appearance, surgical options, need for lifelong
replacement therapy, potential for fertility, views of the family, and, sometimes,
circumstances relating to cultural practices., 76 The new approach emphasizes parental
education and advises physicians to spend ample time with parents.77
While the new approach makes several advances over the traditional approach, it is
far from perfect. It does not advocate that doctors cease performing genital-
normalizing surgeries, but instead urges that surgery should maintain a "functional"
rather than a "cosmetic" approach. 78 More importantly, "the creation of new standards
of care is not binding on medical providers, and it can take many years for medical
practices to change in accordance with new information. ' ,7 9 As a result, the surgical
approach remains the dominant approach in many hospitals.
80
II. INFORMED CONSENT
A. Limitations on Parental Decision-Making Authority
Under the current legal system, parents are afforded a great deal of deference in
making decisions for their children and in controlling their children's upbringing.
81
Included within this decision-making realm is the ability to make medical decisions for
72. Id at 46.
73. Id.
74. Greenberg, supra note 29, at 279.
75. Lee et al., supra note 35, at e488.
76. Id. ate491.
77. Id. at e490.
78. Id. at e491.
79. Anne Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law's Failure to Protect
Intersex Infants, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 78 (2006).
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S.
510 (1925) (finding that a law requiring all children to attend public schools "unreasonably
interfere[d] with the liberty of parents... to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that the "right of
parents to engage [a language instructor for] their children... [is] included within the liberty of
the [Fourteenth] Amendment"); see also Alyssa Connell Lareau, Note, Who Decides? Genital-
Normalizing Surgery on Intersexed Infants, 92 GEO. L.J. 129, 140 & n.72 (2003).
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their minor children.8 2 Parents are granted the authority to consent to medical
procedures for their children because it is assumed "that parents possess what a child
lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's
difficult decisions... [and] that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the
best interests of their children."
8 3
This parental right, however, is not absolute and has been limited in a number of
instances. 84 In particular, parents have limited authority to make medical decisions for
their children when conflicts of interest (such as a parental desire to avoid raising the
child of an incapacitated minor child in the context of sterilization procedures or the
desire to avoid parental discomfort or embarrassment in the context of genital-
normalizing procedures) make it questionable that parents are acting in the best
interests of their child.8 5 Conflicts of this sort are readily visible when the proposed
medical procedure implicates the child's fundamental rights.86 Professor Jennifer
Rosato refers to such conflicts as "categorical conflicts," which are said to exist when
"the treatment decision [at issue] involves a countervailing constitutional right of the
patient that, when exercised, is likely to interfere with the family member's decision.
'87
In instances where a proposed treatment creates a "categorical conflict," blind
deference to parental decision-making authority is inappropriate.
88
Courts have recognized these "categorical conflicts" and have limited parental
decision-making authority concerning medical procedures involving fundamental rights
in the context of abortion.89 In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,
the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that granted parents an "absolute, and possibly
arbitrary, veto" over their minor daughter's fundamental right to seek an abortion. 90 In
Bellotti v. Baird, the Court refined its position, holding that in order to appropriately
balance the parental right to control the upbringing of their children and the
fundamental right to an abortion, statutes that require minors to seek parental consent
before receiving an abortion must also "provide an alternative procedure whereby
authorization for the abortion can be obtained." 91 Alternative authorization procedures
82. Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine when Parents Should Make
Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 5-6
(2000).
83. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
84. See, e.g., id. at 603-09.
85. Lareau, supra note 81, at 142 ("[Dleference to parental decisionmaking can be
overcome if it is shown that the parent decisionmaker has a conflict that has impaired his or her
ability to consider the best interests of the child.").
86. See Rosato, supra note 82, at 43.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. The right to have an abortion is a fundamental right inferred from the liberty interest in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
90. 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
91. 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979). An alternative procedure permits the minor to show by
means of judicial or some other proceeding either that she is mature enough to make the
decision to abort without parental consent, or that an abortion is in her best interest, regardless
of her ability to make an independent decision. Id. at 643-44.
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that amount to "an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" by a third party are not
sufficient.
92
Parental decision-making authority has also been limited, perhaps to an even greater
extent, in the context of sterilization procedures for children. 93 Like the right to an
abortion, the right to procreation is fundamental. 94 Because sterilization procedures
directly implicate fundamental rights and have the potential for extreme abuse, most
jurisdictions require that parents seek judicial authorization in order to have their child
sterilized.95 Unlike most other medical procedures, however, sterilization requires
judicial authorization regardless of whether or not the parents and the doctor are in
agreement. 96 As with the issue of parental consent requirements for abortion, the
fundamental nature of the rights implicated by sterilization procedures justifies limiting
parental decision-making authority.
9 7
B. Genital-Normalizing Surgeries Create "Categorical Conflicts"
As described above, courts have carved out situations in which parental decision-
making authority is limited. Because genital-normalizing surgery implicates the
fundamental right to marriage,98 it falls within the category of medical procedures for
which parents have limited authority to consent.
Some scholars have argued that consent to genital-normalizing surgeries "exceeds
parental authority because it unnecessarily forecloses the child's right to an open
future."99 This argument is based on Professor Joel Feinberg's theory of a child's right
to an open future, which posits that there are certain rights that children, because of
their age, are incapable of exercising. 100 These "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature
and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority.
Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
rights." 10 1 Because these rights cannot be immediately exercised, children entrust these
rights to their parents, who have a duty to hold these rights in safekeeping until the
child is able to exercise them. 0 2 These rights "can be violated 'in advance'. . . before
the child is even in a position to exercise them. [Any] violating conduct guarantees
now that when the child is an autonomous adult, certain key options will already be
closed to him."'10 3 In other words, the child's right to an open future may be foreclosed
92. Id. at 644 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74
(1976)).
93. Beh & Diamond, supra note 17, at 39.
94. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
95. Tamar-Mattis, supra note 79, at 96.
96. Beh & Diamond, supra note 17, at 39.
97. See id
98. See infra Part llI.C.
99. See, e.g., Benson, supra note 27, at 32; Beh & Diamond, supra note 14, at 5.
100. Joel Feinberg, The Child's Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? 124, 125
(William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980).
101. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
102. See Feinberg, supra note 100, at 125-26.
103. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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by parental conduct that ensures that the child will not be able to exercise certain rights
in the future.°4
Included among those rights entrusted by children to their parents for safekeeping is
the right to marriage. 05 It is undisputed that an infant is unable to immediately exercise
the fundamental right to marriage. It is possible, however, for parents to foreclose their
child's future right to marriage by consenting to genital-normalizing surgery. 10' This
potential violation of a fundamental right provides one of the reasons why parental
decision-making authority should be limited in this context. This concept is further
shaped by the way that society has chosen to define and limit marriage to only
"opposite" sex couples.
III. INTERSEXUALS AND MARRIAGE
A. The Importance and Limitations of Marriage
As the Supreme Court stated in Loving v. Virginia, "[t]he freedom to marry has
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men."'10 7 Marriage is a fundamental right,10 8 and it plays a central
role in our society. The Supreme Court has described marriage as the "most important
relation in life,"'10 9 providing the "foundation of the family and of society, without
which there would be neither civilization nor progress."' 10 Because the institution of
marriage is so highly valued by our society, married couples are granted a number of
rights and privileges including tax benefits, inheritance and other death benefits,
decision-making authority over an incapacitated spouse, and evidentiary privileges.'
1
'
Although the right to marriage is fundamental, marriage is ultimately a creation of
the State and is subject to the definitional limitations placed on it by society. As a
result, society has largely chosen to define marriage as a union between a man and a
woman, thus limiting marriage to couples of the "opposite" sex. From this perspective,
only the right to an "opposite sex" marriage is fundamental.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defines
"marriage" as a "legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife"
and defines "spouse" as "a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.","
12
DOMA further recognizes the authority of the states under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to choose whether or not to recognize a same-sex marriage license issued by
another state. 113 A number of states have passed similar statutes and constitutional
amendments limiting marriage to male and female couples, and "[elven in states in
which no legislation exists, the assumption of the courts is that a valid marriage
104. Id. at 126.
105. See id. at 126-27.
106. See infra Part III.C.
107. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
108. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978).
109. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
110. Id. at 211.
111. Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOzO L. REv. 2081, 2090-92 (2005).
112. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
2010]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
requires a union of one man and one woman."' 14 Currently, only five states issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples wishing to marry." 
5
Because of the way that society has chosen to define and limit marriage, a person's
sex is an important aspect of determining whether or not that person is entering into a
valid heterosexual marriage. This issue becomes even more important for intersexuals
who do not fit neatly into either the male or female category.' " 6
B. Legal Determinations of Sex for the Purpose of Marriage
Despite the fact that a majority of states, as well as the federal government, have
chosen to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman, none have actually
defmed what constitutes a man or a woman for that purpose. "7 As a result, this task has
largely been left to the judiciary." 8 While no American courts have discussed the
mechanics of determining the sex of an intersexual for the purpose of marriage, both
Australia" 9 and England120 have reviewed the validity of a marriage where one
member of the marriage is an intersexual. A number of American courts have assessed
the validity of a marriage in which one spouse is a postoperative transsexual-a
transgendered individual who has undergone sex reassignment surgery.'21 These cases
provide a useful starting point because postoperative transsexuals, like intersexuals, do
not fit neatly within the binary gender system.
The courts that have addressed the issue have taken a number of different
approaches. Some courts determine an individual's sex by looking only to biological
factors, while other courts are willing to look to psychological factors in addition to
biological factors. The common thread among all of these cases is the court's
determination of an individual's "true sex" for the purpose of marriage, a concept that
is relevant solely to ensure that the marriage is between members of the "opposite" sex,
thus comporting with the definitional limitations that society has placed on marriage.
1. An Emphasis on Biological Factors
Courts that focus on biological factors determine sex by looking to an individual's
chromosomal and hormonal composition and, perhaps more importantly, that
individual's anatomy at birth. Gender identity is not considered. This approach was
114. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 296.
115. Same-sex marriages are legal in Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
and Vermont. Freedom to Marry, Where Can Gay Couples Get Married?, http://www.
freedomtomarry.org/states.php.
116. Randi E. Frankle, Note, Does a Marriage Really Need Sex?: A Critical Analysis of the
Gender Restriction on Marriage, 30 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 2007, 2026 (2003) ("If marriage is a
fundamental right, limited to opposite sex, or apparently heterosexual couples, classifying an
intersex person becomes extremely important.").
117. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 297-98.
118. Id. at298.
119. See infra Part HI.B.3.
120. See infra Part III.B.I-2.
121. See infra Part III.B.1-2.
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utilized by the English court in Corbett v. Corbett,122 the first case to address the issue
of determining a person's sex in order to assess the validity of a marriage.' 23 In
Corbett, the court considered whether Ashley Corbett, a postoperative male-to-female
transsexual, could legally marry a man. 124 The court determined that there were four
factors that might be considered when determining an individual's sex: (1)
chromosomal factors, (2) gonadal factors, (3) genital factors, and (4) psychological
factors. 125 The court added that two additional factors-hormonal factors and
secondary sex characteristics, such as breasts or physique-may also be relevant.
126
In finding that the marriage was invalid, the court held that a person's sex is fixed at
birth and that Ashley Corbett's sex-change operation did not alter her "true sex," which
was male.1 27 The court further held that only the first three factors--chromosomal
factors, gonadal factors, and genital factors-are controlling, so long as they are
congruent, when determining an individual's sex for the purpose of marriage. 28 The
court declined consideration of Ashley Corbett's gender identity because it considered
marriage to be "a relationship which depends on sex and not on gender."' 29 The court
noted that "[t]he only cases where the term 'change of sex' is appropriate are those in
which a mistake as to sex is made at birth and subsequently revealed by further medical
investigation."' 
30
Most American courts have followed the approach established by the Corbett
court.' 3' In Littleton v. Prange, the Texas Court of Appeals addressed what it
considered to be the fundamental issue in the case: whether "a physician [can] change
the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and counseling, or [whether] a person's
gender [is] immutably fixed by our Creator at birth."'132 The issue in Littleton was
whether Christie Littleton, a postoperative male-to-female transsexual, could enter into
marriage as a woman and later sue for the wrongful death of her husband.
33
Against the background of what the court considered the "wide spread" "opposition
to same-sex marriages,"' 134 the court found that Christie Littleton's marriage to
Jonathon Littleton was invalid:
At the time of birth, Christie was a male, both anatomically and genetically. The
facts contained in the original birth certificate were true and accurate, and the
words contained in the amended certificate are not binding on this court.
122. Corbett v. Corbett (otherwise Ashley), [1971] P. 83, 83.
123. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 299.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 100.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 106.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 107. Courts tend to use the terms "sex" and "gender" interchangeably.
130. Id. at 104.
131. P.L. Chan & Jonathan Herring, Defining, Assigning, and Designing Sex, 16 INT'L J.L.
POL'Y & FAM. 327, 346 (2002).
132. 9 S.W.3d 223, 224 (Tex. App. 1999).
133. Id. at 225 ("In order to have standing to sue under the wrongful death and survival
statues [sic], Christie must be Jonathon's surviving spouse.").
134. Id. at 225-26.
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There are some things we cannot will into being. They just are.'3 5
Refusing to rely on Christie Littleton's sex-change operation, her amended birth
certificate, or her gender identity, the court instead focused on her chromosomal
composition and lack of female internal sex organs.' 36 Ultimately, the court's decision
rested entirely on chromosomes: "The male chromosomes do not change with either
hormonal treatment or sex reassignment surgery. Biologically a post-operative female
transsexual is still a male."'
137
The Probate Court of Stark County, Ohio, placed a similar emphasis on the "true"
birth sex noted on the original birth certificate in In re Ladrach.13 8 In denying a
marriage license to a postoperative male-to-female transsexual, the court stated that
"[i]t is generally accepted that a person's sex is determined at birth by an anatomical
examination by the birth attendant. This results in a declaration on the birth certificate
of either 'boy' or 'girl' . ... This then becomes a person's true sex," which cannot be
altered by a sex change operation.' 39 As in Littleton, the court emphasized that there
was no mistake on the original birth certificate. 4 °
More recently, the Kansas Supreme Court addressed the issue in In re Estate of
Gardiner.14' Following in the footsteps of Corbett, Littleton, and In re Ladrach, the
court relied on biological factors to find that an individual's sex is fixed at birth.142 As
with its predecessors, the Gardiner court emphasized that its decision had to be made
against the backdrop of the public policy against same-sex marriages.1
43
The words "sex," "male," and "female" in everyday understanding do not
encompass transsexuals. The plain, ordinary meaning of "persons of the opposite
sex" contemplates a biological man and a biological woman and not persons who
are experiencing gender dysphoria. A male-to-female post-operative transsexual
does not fit the definition of a female. The male organs have been removed, but the
ability to "produce ova and bear offspring" does not and never did exist. There is
no womb, cervix, or ovaries, nor is there any change in his chromosomes. 144
Therefore, in Kansas, sex is determined by our common understanding of what it
means to be "male" or "female," which in turn is largely determined by looking at
biological and reproductive capabilities.
135. Id. at231.
136. Seeid. at230-31.
137. Id. at 230; see also Michael L. Rosin, Intersexuality and Universal Marriage, 14 LAW
& SExuALrrY 51, 68-70 (2005) ("Chief Justice Hardberger's opinion relies on just a single
factor: the sex chromosomes.").
138. 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987).
139. Id. at 832.
140. Id.
141. 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
142. See id. at 135-36.
143. Id. Kansas defines marriage by statute as "a civil contract between two parties who are
of opposite sex." Id. at 125.
144. Id. at 135.
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2. Consideration of Psychological Factors
Courts that consider psychological factors, on the other hand, are willing to consider
an individual's gender identity as an additional factor in determining an individual's
sex for the purpose of marriage. While the English court declined consideration of
psychological factors in determining the sex of a postoperative transsexual in Corbett
v. Corbett,145 the court held that psychological factors are relevant in determining the
sex of an intersexual in Wv. W. 46
In Corbett, the court went to great lengths to distinguish Ashley Corbett's status as a
transsexual from that of an intersexual.147 In hypothesizing about how it might
determine the sex of an intersexual seeking to marry, the court stated:
This question does not arise in the present case and I must not anticipate, but it
would seem to me to follow from what I have said that greater weight would
probably be given to the genital criteria than to the other two. This problem and, in
particular, the question of the effect of surgical operations in such cases of
physical inter-sex, must be left until it comes for decision.'
48
The English court had the opportunity to visit this issue in W v. W. 149 In that case,
the court was asked to nullify a marriage between a male and an intersexual female on
the grounds that it constituted a same-sex marriage.150 The wife was born with male
chromosomes, male gonads, and sufficiently ambiguous genitalia, such that her sex
could not be readily determined at birth. 151 Doctors gave the wife's parents the option
of choosing her sex, and her parents decided to register the wife as a male and raise her
as a boy.' 52 The wife began developing breasts as a teenager and ultimately identified
with the female gender.1 53 She eventually underwent surgery in order to attain "normal"
female genitalia. 54 Prior to the surgery, she was unable to have sex as either a male or
a female.'
55
The court declined to adhere to the solution it posited in Corbett, and instead held
that all six factors posed by the Corbett court-chromosomal, gonadal, genital,
psychological, hormonal, and secondary sex characteristics-are relevant in
determining an intersexual's sex for the purpose of marriage.' 56 The court relied
heavily on the wife's desire to live as a woman, and on the fact that as a result of that
desire, she underwent surgery that enabled her to consummate her marriage as a
145. See Corbett v. Corbett (otherwise Ashley), [1971] P. 83, 106.
146. Wv.W,[2001]Fam. 11, 111.
147. Corbett, [1971] P. at 98-100, 106.
148. Id. at 106.
149. W, [2001] Farn. at .11.
150. Id. at 112. This Note will refer to the intersexual female in this case as the "wife." The
husband in this case sought to have the marriage nullified so he could remarry in the Church. Id.
at 115.
151. Id. at 113, 120.
152. Id. at 113.
153. Id. at 113-14.
154. Id. at 114.
155. Id. at 121.
156. Id. at 146.
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female.' The court continued to rely on external genitalia as a factor, but unlike
Corbett, the court looked at the characteristics of the wife's genitalia at the time she
entered into marriage rather than at the time of her birth. 5 8 The court also recognized
the difficulty in choosing a sex for a child and suggested that in "cases where a
decision as to the sex or gender in which a child should be brought up [is left] to be
made by doctors and others," a "wait and see" approach might be appropriate. 5 9
The Superior Court of New Jersey took a similar multifactor approach to
determining an individual's sex for the purpose of marriage in M.T v. J.T.,'160 a case
involving the marriage of a postoperative male-to-female transsexual. Like the court in
W v. W, the M.T v. J. T. court departed from the Corbett approach, which limited its
analysis solely to biological factors, and instead considered psychological factors as
relevant to the determination of an individual's sex for the purpose of marriage.
6 1
While the court recognized gender identity as a relevant factor, external genitalia and
sexual capacity were ofparamount importance. 162 Under this approach, psychological
factors become relevant because "[s]exual capacity... requires the coalescence of
both the physical ability and the psychological and emotional orientation to engage in
sexual intercourse as either a male or a female."' 163 Therefore, a court that follows M. T
v. J. T will consider psychological factors, but only if the external genitalia are made to
conform to the psychological sex.'64
3. Intersexuals Have No Sex
The final approach taken by courts to determine the sex of an intersexual for the
purpose of marriage produces the harshest results. Under this approach, intersexuals
cannot be characterized as male or female because they possess characteristics of both
sexes. 65 Because of the ban on same-sex marriages, intersexuals are unable to marry
anyone because of their inability to marry a member of the "opposite" sex.
166
This is the approach taken by the first court to ever consider the marriage of an
intersexual, In the Marriage of C. and D., which involved a marriage between an
intersexual male and a female.' 67 The husband was unaware of his status as an
intersexual until he began to develop breasts and "have a monthly loss ofblood.' 68 His
157. See id.
158. Kogan, supra note 31, at 406.
159. W, [2001] Fain. at 146.
160. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
161. Id. at 209-11 ("[W]e must disagree with the conclusion reached in Corbett that for
purposes of marriage sex is somehow irrevocably cast at the moment of birth, and that for
adjudging the capacity to enter marriage, sex in its biological sense should be the exclusive
standard.").
162. See id. at 209.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 210.
165. In the Marriage of C. and D. (falsely called C.) (1979) 28 A.L.R. 524 (Austl.); see also
Greenberg, supra note 1, at 304.
166. See id. at 528.
167. Id. at 524. This Note will refer to the intersexual male in this case as the "husband."
168. Id. at 525.
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doctors later discovered the presence of an ovary and uterus during an operation for
abdominal pains.169 The husband subsequently underwent surgery to remove his breasts
and "to correct his external sex organs." 170 Though he possessed female chromosomes,
the "surgery ... [was performed] to confirm the recognition that he was born a male
and had been reared as a male."'17' The court invalidated the marriage, finding that the
husband was neither a man nor a woman, and thus could not marry a member of the
"opposite" sex.172 The position taken by the court in this case is considered quite
extreme and has been subject to a great deal of negative criticism for obvious
reasons. 173 It is doubtful that any court would elect to follow the holding because,
regardless of whether or not genital-normalizing surgeries are performed, intersexuals
would be denied the right to marry anyone.'
74
C. Legal Sex for the Intersexed and the Effects of Genital-Normalizing Surgery
American courts have not addressed the issue of how to determine the sex of an
intersexual for the purpose of marriage, and it is unclear which of the approaches
discussed above might be adopted by courts in the event that such a marriage is
presented for review. Because of the wide array of legal tests employed by courts and
the lack of cases involving intersexual marriages, a great deal of ambiguity remains
over what impact, if any, genital-normalizing surgeries will have on the determination
of an individual's legal sex. While courts may choose to rely on international case law
and analogize from cases involving postoperative transsexuals, they remain in
uncharted waters. What is important for purposes of this discussion, however, is that
genital-normalizing surgeries could have a profound impact on how courts view the sex
of an intersexual, and ultimately on the fundamental right of intersexuals to marry.
75
As a result, the parents of intersexed children should not be able to interfere with the
process by being allowed to consent to such surgeries.
1. Courts that Consider Psychological Factors
Courts that take psychological factors into account will likely reach a different
result from those that only consider biological factors. Even courts that consider
psychological factors, however, still heavily emphasize the necessity of genitalia that is
capable of consummating a marriage.' 76 Under an analysis like Wv. W, a court would
look to an individual's desire to live as a member of a given sex, as exemplified by his
or her willingness to conform his or her genitalia to be able to function sexually as a
member of that sex.' 77 The same could be said for an approach like MT. v. J.T., in
169. Id.
170. Id. at 525-26.
171. Id. at 526.
172. Id. at 528.
173. Greenberg, supra note 29, at 282 tbl. 1. This holding was ultimately overruled. See In re
Kevin (2003) 30 Fam. L.R. 1, 41 (Austl.).
174. See Frankle, supra note 116, at 2027-28.
175. See Haas, supra note 27, at 60-61; Lloyd, supra note 27, at 187.
176. See M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 209-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
177. SeeWv. W,[2001]Fam. 111, 111.
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which the court considers gender identity, but only if the external genitalia are made to
agree with the gender identity.
If parents elect to have their child's genitalia "normalized," and the child ultimately
identifies with a different gender, then that child would be unable to marry without
undergoing additional surgery to reverse the previous surgeries performed on him or
her as a child.178 This process, if medically possible, would likely be both expensive
and traumatic, and "may prohibit some, otherwise qualified, intersexuals from
marrying."' 179 By consenting to genital-normalizing surgery, the intersexual child's
parents have virtually decided the sex of the person that their child may marry by
altering their child's genitalia and ultimately determining how their child will
consummate his or her future marriage.
On the other hand, it is not entirely clear whether an individual in the position of the
wife in W v. W would have been able to marry without having genital-normalizing
surgery performed because of her inability to have sex as either a male or a female.'
8 0
While the courts in Wv. Wand M T. v. J. T. emphasized the ability to function sexually,
it is doubtful that a court would force an individual to undergo surgery as a prerequisite
to marriage.' 8 1 In any event, a "wait and see" approach like the one proposed by the
court in Wv. Wis best because, even if forced to undergo surgery, it is the intersexual,
and not the parent, who will make the decision.
2. Courts that Only Consider Biological Factors
Applying a purely biological test to an intersexual that has undergone genital-
normalizing surgery is difficult and could lead to a number of different results. This
problem flows directly from the insistence on finding an individual's "true sex," which
must be either male or female. Intersexuals, however, do not fit neatly into either
category.' 2 A court could find that, regardless of whether or not genital-normalizing
surgery has been performed, intersexuals do not have a "true sex" because they possess
both male and female characteristics. 8 3 This result, however, is highly unlikely since it
would deprive an entire group of citizens of the right to marry. 184 Therefore, courts are
left with the impossible task of ferreting out an individual's "true sex" and forcing
intersexuals to fit into the binary gender system, all for the ultimate purpose of
determining whether the contemplated marriage is one of "opposite" sexes.
The difficulties posed by the notion of finding an individual's "true sex" were
recognized in Justice Angelini's concurring opinion in Littleton, in which she stated
"that 'real difficulties ... will occur if these three criteria [chromosomal, gonadal and
genital tests] are not congruent.' We must recognize the fact that, even when biological
factors are considered, there are those individuals whose sex may be ambiguous.'
8A 5
178. See Haas, supra note 27, at 61.
179. Id.
180. See Kogan, supra note 31, at 411-14.
181. See id. at 403.
182. Knouse, supra note 29.
183. See supra Part III.B.3.
184. See Frankle, supra note 116, at 2027-28.
185. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 232 (Tex. App. 1999) (Angelini, J., concurring)
(alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Corbett v. Corbett (otherwise Ashley), [ 197 1]
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This statement reveals that the Littleton court had the plight of the intersexual in mind
when it rendered its decision, yet it still advanced a test that relied almost entirely on
chromosomes. I8 6 While Justice Angelini expressed no opinion as to how the court
would or should handle a marriage involving an intersexual, her concurrence shows
that the court had an opportunity to carve out an exception allowing for consideration
of psychological factors when determining the "true sex" of intersexuals, but chose not
to.
187
The question then becomes, how does one define an intersexual's "true sex"? If an
individual's "true sex" is based entirely on chromosomes, as the court presumed in
Littleton, then genital-normalizing surgery will have no effect on an intersexual's
ability to enter into marriage because surgery cannot change an individual's
chromosomes. If "true sex" is based on whether or not an individual has the ability to
bear or beget offspring as the court held in Gardiner, then this too cannot be altered by
surgery.' 8 8 In both Littleton and Gardiner, the courts discussed and rejected man-made
anatomical characteristics.18 9 It remains to be seen, however, whether such courts
would consider genital-normalizing surgery as creating man-made genitalia, or as
restoring genitalia to the condition they would have been it had it not been for an
anatomical anomaly. If a court were to view genital-normalizing surgery as a "cure" for
ambiguous genitalia, as much of the medical profession does, 190 then it might find that
an individual's "true sex" is the one carved from the surgeon's knife. Having
established a "true sex," the intersexual would be unable to alter it in the future, and
may not be able to marry as a result.
The analysis becomes even more complicated with the concept of birth sex, which
the court in In re Ladrach considered to be the "true sex.,191 The court defined birth
sex as the sex determined by the birth attendant after examination.' 92 In both Littleton
and In re Ladrach, the courts noted that mistakes could be made in assigning a sex at
birth and implied that this would not affect an individual's "true sex" for the purpose of
marriage. 193 Prior to having genital-normalizing surgery, intersexuals can change their
legal sex by petitioning the court and showing that they have ambiguous genitalia and
that they identify with the opposite sex.194 Once genital-normalizing surgery is
performed, however, an intersexual no longer has ambiguous genitalia, and his or her
legal sex cannot be changed without subsequent surgeries. 95 From this perspective,
"genital reconstruction surgically defines an intersexed person as male or female, thus,
prohibiting them from marriage to a person of their 'same' gender."'
96
P. 83).
186. See id. at 230-32.
187. See id. at 232.
188. Greenberg, supra note 29, at 281-82.
189. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231 ("Her female anatomy, however, is all man-made. The
body that Christie inhabits is a male body in all aspects other than what the physicians have
supplied.").
190. See supra Part I.A.
191. See 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987).
192. Id.
193. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231; In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 831.
194. Haas, supra note 27, at 60-61.
195. Id. at 61.
196. Id. at 60.
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Because of the difficulties presented by a purely biological test, Professor Terry
Kogan argues that courts would be forced to look at psychological factors when
determining the "true sex" of intersexuals because of the biological incongruities
present in intersexuals.' 97 Professor Kogan bases his argument on the transition from
the Corbett court, which theorized that genital factors would be controlling in the case
of intersexuals, to the court in W v. W, which found that all six factors posed by the
Corbett court, including psychological factors, need to be considered. 98 Under this
approach, a court would always look to psychological factors in determining the sex of
an intersexual for marriage, even if that same court would ignore psychological factors
when determining a postoperative transsexual's sex for the purpose of marriage.
While Professor Kogan's argument might hold true for intersexuals who have not
undergone genital-normalizing surgery,'99it may not apply to individuals who have
been subject to such procedures. This is so because the mere fact that genital-
normalizing surgery has been performed might change a court's view of whether or not
biological incongruities are present. If Professor Kogan is correct, then a court would,
regardless of whether or not genital-normalizing surgery has been performed, consider
psychological factors and likely apply a test similar to W v. W. On the other hand, a
court might find that once an individual has undergone genital-normalizing surgery, his
or her sex is "surgically defme[d] ... as male or female," 200 thus removing genital
ambiguity as well as the need to look to psychological factors.201 Under the latter
approach, the mere fact that genital-normalizing surgery has been performed could lead
a court to apply a biological test that ignores gender identity as a factor when it might
otherwise have deferred to gender identity as the defining factor.
D. Different Jurisdictions, Different Definitions
Because of the numerous approaches taken by courts in addressing marriages with
postoperative transsexuals, as well as the variety of ways that those courts may in turn
evaluate intersexual marriages, "the intersex adult's ability to marry a person of the
opposite sex may very well depend on his or her state of residence., 20 2 These tests all
make clear the problems that arise from the law's deep reliance on anatomy for
determining an individual's "true sex."203 There would not be an issue if the law
developed in such a way as to allow individuals to establish a legal sex based
197. Kogan, supra note 31, at 403 (arguing that intersexuals are at an advantage over
transsexuals because courts will be forced to consider psychological factors when determining
the sex of an intersexual). This situation is precisely what happened in England in the transition
from Corbett to Wv. W. Id. at 404-05. While the Corbett court initially theorized that genital
factors would be controlling, the court in Wv. W found that all six factors posed by the Corbett
court need to be considered. Id. at 405.
198. Id. at 404-05.
199. See id. at 403-11.
200. Haas, supra note 27, at 60.
201. See Kogan, supra note 31, at 403-11.
202. See Lloyd, supra note 27, at 187.
203. See Greenberg, supra note 1.
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completely on their gender identity, regardless of the appearance of their genitalia or
their chromosomal make up.2°4 Unfortunately, however, this does not seem likely.
The problem could be solved on a more fundamental level by legislation that
recognizes same-sex marriages. 20 5 In the six states that issue same-sex marriage
licenses, there is no need to determine an individual's "true sex" because individuals
may marry whomever they please, regardless of sex. 20 6 In these states, an intersexual's
fundamental right to marriage is not threatened by genital-normalizing surgery.
Because of DOMA, however, a marriage recognized as valid in one state does not have
to be recognized as valid in another.20 7 Therefore, until all fifty states expand their
definition of marriage to include same-sex couples, the rights of intersexuals to marry
will continue to be threatened by genital-normalizing surgeries. This analysis makes
clear that the problem has been largely created by the way that society views sex and
gender and by the way that society has chosen to define and limit marriage.
IV. A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION
Because of the dehumanizing nature of genital-normalizing surgeries and the
fundamental importance of the rights implicated by such surgeries, it is vital that the
legislature step in to give a voice to intersex children whose voices are not heard
during the decision-making process. In particular, the legislature should enact a
moratorium on such procedures, except in the case of a real medical emergency, until
the child is capable of making his or her own decision on whether or not to submit to
surgery.
20 8
Numerous physicians and scholars have argued for a higher level of informed
consent to better protect intersex children and to make sure that parents have all of the
relevant information necessary to make an informed decision. 209 But this heightened
level of informed consent does nothing to protect the child's fundamental right to
marriage, nor any of the other fundamental rights implicated by genital-normalizing
surgeries. In addition, a heightened standard of informed consent still leaves the
intersexual out of the decision-making process. For this reason, as well as the potential
effects of genital-normalizing surgery on marriage, judicial oversight is an equally
insufficient method of protecting the rights of intersex children.210
Case law makes clear that governmental oversight over genital-normalizing
surgeries is appropriate. In Parham v. J.R., the Supreme Court evaluated the
constitutionality of a Georgia statute that enabled parents to institutionalize their minor
204. See Kogan, supra note 31, at 416.
205. Id. at417-18.
206. See id.
207. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
208. See Intersex Soc'y of N. Am., What Does ISNA Recommend for Children With
Intersex?, http://www.isna.org/faq/patient-centered. ("Surgeries done to make the genitals look
'more normal' should not be performed until a child is mature enough to make an informed
decision for herself or himself. Before the patient makes a decision, she or he should be
introduced to patients who have and have not had the surgery. Once she or he is fully informed,
she or he should be provided access to a patient-centered surgeon.").
209. See Beh & Diamond, supra note 14, at 20-21.
210. See supra Part III.C.
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child despite the child's liberty interest in not being hospitalized.2 1 Because the child
was exercising a fundamental right, the Court held that it was necessary for someone to
"exercise independent judgment as to the child's need for confinement., 212 The Court
found that a staff physician is sufficient to serve in that role, "so long as he or she is
free to evaluate independently the child's mental and emotional condition and need for
treatment."
21 3
With genital-normalizing surgeries, however, parents have absolute control over the
decision to subject their child to surgery. In Parham, the Court found that the parents
did not actually have absolute control over the decision to institutionalize their child
because a staff physician had to exercise independent judgment regarding whether or
not hospitalization was an appropriate form of treatment.2 14 This, however, is not the
case with genital-normalizing surgeries. The dominant treatment protocol for children
born with ambiguous genitalia is genital-normalizing surgery, so a physician's
independent judgment will always be the same: if the child has ambiguous genitalia,
then surgery is appropriate. 215 This judgment is not independent. It is a rubber stamp.
Even if independent judicial review were required, the result would likely be the
same. "It is unusual that anyone champions the interest of the child when the treating
physician and parents agree on treatment, even though the child may have competing
interests. 2 16 This is precisely the issue recognized by legislators who have crafted
additional protections with regard to the sterilization of minors and mentally impaired
individuals. 2 17 A legislative ban on genital-normalizing surgeries is needed to protect
intersex children, perhaps to an even greater extent than with sterilization, because
genital-normalizing surgeries affect not only the child's fundamental right to marriage,
but also his or her rights to procreation, bodily integrity, and privacy.
218
CONCLUSION
Genital-normalizing surgeries are dehumanizing, and their implications for the
fundamental rights of intersexuals to marry provide only one of many reasons that the
practice should be ceased immediately. 21 9 Fortunately, the problems for the right to
marriage that are posed by genital-normalizing surgeries are largely caused by the way
that society has chosen to define and limit marriage. These problems can be solved by
211. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
212. Id. at 604 (concluding that "the child's rights and the nature of the commitment
decision are such that parents cannot always have absolute and unreviewable discretion to
decide whether to have a child institutionalized").
213. Id. at607.
214. Id.
215. See supra Part I.A.
216. Beh & Diamond, supra note 17, at 39.
217. Id. at 39-40.
218. See Benson, supra note 27 (discussing genital-normalizing surgery and the rights to
bodily integrity, personality, sexuality, and gender identity); Haas, supra note 27 (discussing
genital-normalizing surgery and the rights to bodily integrity, procreation, marriage); Lloyd,
supra note 27 (discussing genital-normalizing surgery and the rights to bodily integrity, sexual
gratification, procreation, and marriage).
219. DE MARIA ARANA, supra note 10.
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expanding the scope of marriage to include same-sex couples.22° However, this
solution still does not solve the underlying problem that genital-normalizing surgeries
are inhumane and are performed on children without their consent or consideration.2
21
The fact that genital-normalizing surgeries are performed at all reflects society's
reliance on a binary gender system that is deeply flawed and that leads parents to think
that such surgeries are necessary. The rights of intersex children will continue to be
threatened until society fundamentally changes the way it views sex and gender and the
way it defines and limits marriage. Until that day, it is incumbent upon the legislature
to protect the rights of this class of citizens whose voices are not heard.
220. See supra Part III.D.
221. See id.
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